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EXAMINATION, &c.

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**I**T has been so much the fashion, lately, to enquire into the conduct of all our Commanders, both by sea and land, upon every event of our efforts, to quell rebellion, or resist our natural enemies, that, I wonder amongst the numberless inferior misfortunes and failures, which have been so strictly investigated, that nobody has yet entered into a serious consideration of the cause and necessity, which lost the nation a flourishing army, “ in the full vigour of health, discipline,

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“ and

“ and valour.” The Legislature have declared, that so long as the Commander of that expedition is American property, they cannot examine *him*, whom they have not the power, either to release, or punish, in consequence of his innocence or guilt being proved: but individuals, in a free country, have a right in all circumstances, to examine and judge of the conduct of men acting for them, in a public capacity; the characteristic humanity of the English, prevents their oppressing the unfortunate and unhappy, and their natural spirit and generosity, inclines them to pity and esteem a brave man struggling with hardships, and partaking adversity, with those who would have conducted to, and in a less degree shared, his prosperity had he been successful; but when we see a man callous to the sufferings of his fellow-soldiers and unabashed by the disapprobation of his fellow-citizens, at the same time, the sole cause perhaps of the captivity of an army, and

and certainly the only one exempt from the consequent miseries, and inconveniencies of it; humanity and esteem, no longer check our indignation at presumption and misconduct; how far these can be proved, will be the subject of consideration, in the following sheets.

A pamphlet, entitled, "Remarks upon General Howe's Account of his Proceedings on Long Island, &c." (published in 1778, and attributed at the time, to a person high in office) makes this very indisputable observation—"If a measure have been originally wrong, and ill concerted, or was it in itself too hazardous, or impracticable; and we lay upon the Commander the blame of not having succeeded in it, we may lose a good General and retain a bad Minister. If on the other hand, the measure, as originally planned, was right and proper, and we blame the Minister because the General misbehaved in the

“ execution, in that case, we may lose a  
 “ good Minister and retain a bad Com-  
 “ mander:” as there is a possibility of *both*  
 being unequal to their situations, I will  
 venture to carry the idea still farther, and  
 say, that when it shall be proved, that  
 equal ignorance attended the plan and  
 execution of any measure, it is the duty  
 of every honest man and good citizen, to  
 endeavour, to the utmost of his power,  
 to expose the weakness, and punish the  
 presumption, both of the Minister and  
 General, that the country may no longer  
 suffer, both by their misconduct; and by  
 being deprived of the services which abler  
 men in their stations would render it.

I will, upon these principles, examine  
 the plan and conduct of the Northern  
 Expedition; and I hope Sir William  
 Howe will excuse me, if in the course  
 of this examination, I should speak my  
 sentiments of a part of his conduct, upon  
 which

which he has demanded a Court of Enquiry; if I have mistaken his motives, his explanation of them will clear it up, if I have guessed right, the obviousness of them cannot hurt his cause.

The Campaign of 1778 was designed for the decisive one; every preparation was made to render it active, and, no doubt, it was intended to be well concerted. The Generals, as usual, were to send home their plan of operations, which the Ministers were to adopt if they approved it, or to substitute others if they judged it expedient: their approbation of any scheme made it their own; for they were aware, and have confessed, that the wisdom or impracticability of any *Plan*, was to be attributed to the Minister. Upon these grounds I may therefore venture to say, that the *Minister* invested General Burgoyne, in preference to General Carlton, with the active Command in the

the Northern American Army\*, and directed him, after having possessed himself of the important post of Ticonderoga, to *proceed* through the Northern Provinces, pass the North River, and *push* on to Albany. How far the preference of one Man to another is proper, I shall not examine, nor, as it is mere matter of opinion, can I determine; the event, which decides in the judgment formed of them, as it could not influence, cannot in justice be objected to the choice made between them. The propriety of possessing Ticonderoga was obvious, it was an expedient, nay a necessary step; so far I coincide in opinion with the Minister, approve his plan, and pass over his preference; but I own myself at a loss when I attempt to discover the prudence of passing the North River, or

\* In the course of the American war we have seen two instances of the imprudence of the Chief in Command, suffering the second to go near the Court. *Les absens ont toujours tort.*

the expediency of *pushing* on to Albany. By the first you threw the impediments of a rapid, broad, unfordable River, to the retreat of an army, unweildy with the baggage of necessaries and luxury, and hampered in an intended forced march with a train of artillery equal (in number at least) to what would be required for a succession of Flemish sieges: the end to be answered by the second is too well concealed for my utmost attention, with what little ingenuity I have to discover; it could not be to raise men, or conciliate friends, for the whole march, as far as they went, was through uncultivated wood, except a few ill inhabited narrow slips of cultivation, which scattered upon the banks of the North River, threw just light enough upon the Piece to mark the dreary darkness of the general Design. Was it their intention merely to support their friends *at* Albany, and encourage them to declare themselves? Still their measures appear to me,

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ill concerted for the execution of their purposes :—An army, harrassed by opposition, reduced by the fatigues and difficulties incidental to a comfortless march through deserts, where the indulgence of fresh provisions could hardly ever be procured to gratify the active and relieve the exhausted or sickly soldier; whose marches became every day more difficult and less expeditious, from the failure of horses ( whose provender frequently consisted of leaves alone ) in a country which afforded no recruit of them :—Such an army, I say, even supposing it possible they should surmount all these difficulties, would, indisputably, not answer the purpose for which they were designed, so well as they would have done, unexposed to these hardships. This, I conceive, would have been the case had they been embarked after the reduction of Ticonderoga, and carried in transports to New-York, where they would have had a shorter march to Albany, through a well-inclined,

inclined, and richly cultivated country; at New-York too, their wants, if they had any, might have been supplied, and their force, if it was necessary, augmented.

It has been said that the ill-success of the Northern Army, was occasioned by the Southern one going to Philadelphia; that plan it is reported, and I hear he avows it, originated with Sir William Howe; but it was approved by the Ministry, and consequently became theirs: the Commander in Chief at New-York was to consider what he thought expedient to be done with the troops under his command, without relation to any other, the Minister was to judge whether that frustrated his intentions to the Northward, and should have made his decision accordingly; he knew that Sir William Howe marching to the southward, could never join an army marching from the northward; Lord George Germaine has  
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declared a junction never was intended, Sir William Howe therefore is not to be blamed for going to the southward; *his* object was fulfilled, *his* operations were successful, and *his* army very little diminished by the campaign; any objections that may be made to his going up the Chesapeake instead of the Delaware, I have good reason to believe he will easily obviate, by producing the intelligence he received off Capes: The reduction of Philadelphia was a favourite object, and with reason; it was a most essential one; the possession of it did not cost more than it was worth, and the country was in fact conquered by the loss of it, had not the failure of the Northern Army decided the French in the part they were to take, and thereby reduced our troops to the necessity of abandoning an acquisition, which was become as hazardous to us to possess, as it had been distressing to the Rebels to lose.—I could easily demonstrate the truth of this assertion,

fertion, but it is foreign from my present object; all I wish to prove, is, that the expedition to the southward being known and approved by the Minister, takes away any blame that has been attempted to be thrown on the General for the sacrifice that was made of the Northern Army; nay more, he informed General Burgoyne that he was to expect no support from him—but that circumstance more particularly relates to General Burgoyne's fatal perseverance in *marching*. The plan, such as it was, I trust appears to have been (at least eventually) the Minister's; the execution of it was the General's. I will now examine his conduct in every step towards the Convention, and in all his proceedings since that disgraceful epocha.

However weak and ill-judged the conception of this Plan may appear, the preposterousness of the Execution by no means fell short of it, but bore nearly

the same affinity to the invention which madness does to folly.

General Burgoyne found himself, at his own request, at the head of an army of ten thousand men, composed of troops from different nations, excellent in their kind, but totally different in their manners, discipline, manœuvres, and inclinations, a situation which required all the judgment of an experienced, cool, steady, *war-formed* General. When we consider the genius and character of the Phaeton who took the reigns of command, we shall rather be inclined to blame him for the undertaking than the failure. General Burgoyne, with good parts, and no judgment; great reading and little experience; very naturally supposed himself equal to any command, and as naturally failed in the performance of what he undertook.

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His first operations were feebly, when at all opposed; the reduction of Ticonderoga, put the finishing stroke to that self-approbation which had driven him to solicit the command, and from that moment he shone forth in all the tinsel splendor of enlighten'd absurdity: his first proclamation, (composed of metaphorical periods, of harmonious, selected words, whose greatest merit was obscuring, the Bobadil boasts they were meant to convey) exhibited the insubstantial exuberance of parts, unpruned by judgment.

The same want of judgment, accompanied him throughout:—his reading, informed him that detachments were usually made for the purposes of gathering intelligence, recruiting horses, or establishing magazines; the numbers to be detached, might perhaps too, have been specified by some author, writing for the immense armies of the European Continent; pleased at the discovery, and resolved to proceed  
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in every step *secundem artem*, General Burgoyne, with too much genius to be embarrassed with calculation, makes a detachment of the numbers so proposed, from his small army; thus his operations, like a topographical plan, without any scale, contained every part of military routine, except its proportions; the consequence was pretty generally foreseen by officers abroad, and not totally unexpected by the people at home, neither the fears of the first, nor the suspicions of the last, were falsified, Governor Skeene was attacked, and his detachment overthrown.

But the General, superior to all events, did not conceive it necessary to change his mode of proceeding upon this repulse; and in opposition to the opinion of his general officers, but in strict compliance with the *original* positive orders of the Minister, he determined to pass the North River; no bridge however was thrown over it, nor any means of securing a retreat,

treat, over the fords near Fort Edward concerted, 'till the Rebels, by establishing a passage lower down, and appearing on the opposite shore, made the attempt impracticable.

From this moment he began to feel his situation embarrassing, every day augmented his difficulties, invested as he was, by an army hourly encreasing: so critical a situation was beyond the precepts of his reading:—his experience was not extensive enough to furnish him with precedents: nor his judgment strong enough to enable him to act decisively without them. Conscious that he should receive no relief from the Southward, diffident of the possibility of retreat, and disinclined to any attempt to force his way through the enemy; he waited inactive from the 3d to the 13th of October, till the consumption of his provisions, and the augmentation of the enemys' numbers, might afford a specious reason, for  
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delivering up the sacrifices of his ignorance and misconduct: I have his own authority for supposing this to be his motive, for in his letter to Lord George Germaine, he says, with a kind of exulting satisfaction, " 13th at night . . . .  
 " at this period, an exact account of  
 " the provisions was taken, and the circumstances stated in the opening of  
 " this letter became compleat." \*

The expected hour arrived, the negotiation was opened, and the Convention concluded; in his relation of which, after having reduced the honor of the nation, and the reputation of the British soldiery to the lowest state of humiliation, he plumes himself upon the effectual preservation of national and personal honor, by a march of a few yards, and the operation of piling instead of ground-

\* For the circumstances stated, vide General Burgoyne's letter.

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ing their arms, as if an ideal form, an inconsequential ceremony, could wipe out the stain of a real and unparalleled disgrace: General Gates, who is an Englishman, saw it in a different light, some remains of national feeling made *him* unwilling to *exhibit* an humiliation of Britons, which their *leader* was ready to *partake*; he drew off his troops, and humanely spared his countrymen any addition to the shame and regret they must feel, in looking on each other in the act of laying aside the arms which their country had entrusted to them for its honor and support.

Sure the General's studies might have furnished him with precedents more flattering to his ambitious mind, than the defeat of the ten thousand Prussians under General Fink, had he even had the same favourable circumstances to plead in his excuse; the particulars of that event are too well known to need being repeated

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peated here, and may be found at large in the history of the last war.

Let us now examine the motives (according to his own account of them) which induced General Burgoyne to *wait* 'till want of provisions obliged him to surrender; he says, "The difficulties of a retreat to Canada were clearly foreseen, as was the dilemma, should the retreat be effected, of leaving such an army as General Gates's to act against Sir William Howe; this consideration operated forcibly to determine me to abide events as long as possible; and I reasoned thus; the expedition I commanded was evidently meant to be *hazarded*; circumstances might require it should be *devoted*; a critical junction of Mr. Gates's force might possibly decide the fate of war, the failure of my junction with Sir Henry Clinton, or the loss of my retreat of Canada could only be a partial misfortune."

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The General's parts are allowed to be very good, but he overvalues them when he imagines they can deceive a nation with such inconclusive arguments as he here produces; he knew the nature of General Gates's army too well to suppose that they could be marched away to join General Washington; he must have known the difficulty of keeping American Militia together for any length of time; General Gates's troops too consisted chiefly of New-Englanders and Connecticut men, whose aversion to quitting their own Province is proverbial; and there have been many instances of even what they call their Continental Troops refusing to march to the southern Provinces, there was therefore little reason to suppose that the *escape* of the Northern Army would occasion so formidable a junction against Sir William Howe.

But to take the General's own ground, supposing no part of General Gates's army

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would moulder away in consequence of their being disappointed in their hopes of taking or destroying the Northern army; still it was natural to imagine they would follow him in his retreat, and by that means lose so much time, and so far increase their distance from the southern Provinces, that the season would be too far advanced for them to join General Washington before the armies had got into their winter quarters; so that the retreat towards Canada, not the inactive delay near Saratoga, appears to have been the most obvious means of retarding the formidable junction of the Rebel armies: For what end could be answered by *abstaining events*? the Convention did not extend its inactive effects to the Rebel army, *they* were still at liberty to act for those who had employed them, and to join General Washington, improved by all the spirit and ardour which compleat victory and self approbation invariably inspires; and reinforced  
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by the solid advantages of an immense train of well-appointed artillery, together with at least three thousand five hundred stand of well-conditioned arms, and a plentiful store of ammunition for both.

But the event is the best confutation of General Burgoyne's false reasoning; General Gates with what force he could bring, did join Mr. Washington, but Sir William Howe was not overwhelmed, nor even beaten, repulsed, or checked, in consequence of that junction.

That the army from Canada, was *bazarded*\* is too fatally apparent; if it was *meant* to be so, the Minister should be called to a strict account, and upon proof punished as so flagitious an intention deserves: that they were *devoted* too is certain, and it is equally so by

\* By hazarded, I understand he means, the total loss of the army risked.

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whom ; whether from misconduct or misfortune ; let the unprejudiced public judge, if from the former they have a right to expect the inadequate atonement of the destructive head, which has sacrificed so many protecting hands ; if from the latter, he may claim their pity and forgiveness : at all events, however, the *fate of war* was indubitably decided by the sacrifice of those troops ; the consequences which might easily be foreseen, from the total loss of a whole army, immediately followed ; our posts at Ticonderoga, &c. were exposed to imminent danger, and the victorious enemy, besides the diminution of our force, and possession of our arms and artillery, acquired the countenance of a powerful ally, and the assistance of a formidable fleet.

The Military History affords numberless examples of the escape of troops surrounded by superior numbers. The army under General Gates, composed of Mi-  
litia

militia levied for the occasion, and assembled on the spot, were the kind of enemy most to be desired for such an attempt; the well disciplined and gallant troops under General Burgoyne were equally well calculated for a desperate *coup de main*; what reason was there then why they should not be divided into eight or ten different columns, under the command of approved good officers with four days bread in their blankets: In this situation they might have forced their way through the enemy, and by remaining separate and avoiding roads, the columns might have arrived at an appointed rendezvous, in the neighbourhood of Albany, or at Fort Clinton or Montgomery, where they would have joined Sir Henry Clinton, (who with a small force, had made his way within forty miles of them, and upon their surrender retreated uninvited) those who had perished in the attempt would at least have died with unsullied honor; and the survivors instead of

of suffering captivity, would at this moment have enjoyed the grateful admiration and applause of their fellow-subjects; but *Dis aliter visum est!* The Die was cast, and the object now was to make the best of affairs as they stood; lavish encomiums were bestowed on the victors by the vanquished Chief; their politeness, courage, affability, and humanity, were applauded, and in conclusion, leave demanded that the General might return home to vindicate his own conduct, and protect the reputation of his army. The request was complied with; and the *ignis fatuus*, which had led the unfortunate troops into so inextricable a dilemma disappeared, to mislead if possible the rest of his fellow-subjects at home; and (as it appears by his conduct) to avoid partaking the troubles and distresses of his own creation.

His exclusion on his arrival from the presence of his Sovereign, was the first, though

though not the only mark of the almost universal disgust and disapprobation his conduct had excited. He demanded soon afterwards an enquiry into his conduct which was refused for the reasons I have already mentioned in the beginning of this Pamphlet; he remained nevertheless in England, and indeed with some colour of reason so long as any probability appeared of the convention being ratified, and the troops released. But as soon as it was known that the Congress had determined not to fulfill the agreement; no immediate prospect of enquiry into the General's conduct remained: what *then* detained him here, unless an effeminate preference of luxurious desertion, to the duty so peculiarly his, of sharing the captivity of his army.

*For shame, Sir! Consider you are still in the service, and though you have lost all estimation as a GENERAL, do not render yourself despicable as a MAN. Fly to your proper*  
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*situation,*

*situation, lest the world should suspect that the soreness you once felt on the subject of honor has grown to the last insensibility of mortification, and that you are now become callous: But if common report be true, even this effort has been procrastinated, till it is become impossible, and the RECALL sent you by the Congress, has given the death-stab to your long wounded honor.*

*As it may be inconvenient to many, and impossible to some of my Readers to turn to an old Gazette, I have here printed General Burgoyne's Letter to Lord George Germaine.*



G A Z E T T E.

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*Whiteball, December, 15, 1777.*

**T**HIS afternoon Captain Craig, of the 47th regiment, arrived from Quebec with the following duplicate of a letter from Lieutenant-general Burgoyne, to Lord George Germaine, the original of which has not yet been received.

*Albany, October 20, 1777.*

My Lord,

No possibility of communication with your Lordship having existed since the beginning of September, at which time my last [dispatches were sent away, I have to report to your Lordship the proceedings of the army under

under my command from that period ;—a series of hard toil, incessant effort, stubborn action, till disabled in the collateral branches of the army by the total defection of the Indians ; the desertion or timidity of the Canadians and Provincials, some individuals excepted ; disappointed in the last hope of any timely co-operation from other armies ; the regular troops reduced by losses from the best parts to 3500 fighting men, not 2000 of which were British ; only three days provisions, upon short allowance, in store ; invested by an army of sixteen thousand men, and no apparent means of retreat remaining, I called into Council all the Generals, Field Officers, and Captains, commanding corps, and by their unanimous concurrence and advice, I was induced to open a treaty with Major-general Gates.

Your Lordship will see by the papers transmitted herewith the disagreeable prospect which attended the first overtures, and when the terms concluded are compared, I trust that the spirit of the Councils I have mentioned, which, under such circumstances, dictated

dictated instead of submitting, will not be refused a share of credit.

Before I enter upon the detail of these events, I think it a duty of justice, my Lord, to take upon myself the measure of having passed the Hudson's River, in order to force a passage to Albany I did not think myself authorized to call any men into Council, when the peremptory tenor of my orders, and the season of the year, admitting no alternative.

Provisions for about thirty days having been brought forward, the other necessary stores prepared, and the bridge of boats completed, the army passed the Hudson's River on the 13th and 14th of September, and encamped on the heights and in the plain of Saratoga the enemy being then in the neighbourhood of Still-water.

15th. The whole army made a movement forward, and encamped in a good position in a place called Dovogot.

16th.

16th. It being found that there were several bridges to repair, that work was begun under cover of strong detachments, and the same opportunity was taken to reconnoitre the country.

17th The army renewed their march, repaired other bridges, and encamped upon advantageous ground, about four miles from the enemy.

18th. The enemy appeared in considerable force to obstruct the further repair of bridges, and with a view it was conceived, to draw on an action where artillery could not be employed; a small loss was sustained in skirmishing, but the work of the bridges was effected.

19th. The passages of a great ravin, and other roads towards the enemy, having been reconnoitred, the army advanced in the following order :

Brigadier-general Frazer's corps, sustained by Lieutenant-colonel Breyman's corps, made a circuit in order to pass the ravin commodiously, without quitting the heights, and  
after-

afterwards to cover the march of the line to the right: these corps moved in three columns, and had the Indians, Canadians, and Provincials upon their fronts and flanks. The British line, led by me in person, passed the ravin in a direct line South, and formed in order of battle as fast as they gained the summit, where they waited to give time to Frazer's corps to make the circuit, and to enable the left wing and artillery, which, under the command of Major-general Philips and Major-general Reidesel, kept the great road and meadows near the river, in two columns, and had bridges to repair, to be equally ready to proceed. The 47th regiment guarded the batteaux.

The signal guns, which had been previously settled to give notice of all the columns being ready to advance, having been fired between one and two o'clock, the march continued, the scouts and flankers of the column of the British line were soon fired upon from small parties, but with no effect; after about an hour's march, the picquets, which made the advanced guard of that column, were attacked in force, and obliged to give ground, but they soon rallied and were sustained.

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On the first opening of the wood, I formed the troops ; a few cannon shot dislodged the enemy at a house from whence the picquets had been attacked ; and Brigadier-general Frazer's corps had arrived with such precision in point of time, as to be found in a very advantageous height on the right of the British.

In the mean time the enemy, not acquainted with the combination of the march, had moved in great force out of their intrenchments, with a view of turning the line upon the right ; and being checked by the position of Brigadier-general Frazer, countermarched in order to direct their great effort to the left of the British.

From the nature of the country, movements of this nature, however near, may be effected without a possibility of their being discovered.

About three o'clock the action began by a very vigorous attack on the British line, and continued with great obstinacy till after sunset. The enemy being continually supplied with

with fresh troops, the strefs lay upon the 20th, 21st, and 62d regiments, most parts of which were engaged near four hours without intermission: the 9th had been ordered early in the day to form in reserve. The grenadiers and 24th regiment were some part of the time brought into action, as were part of the light infantry; and all these corps charged with their usual spirit.

The riflemen, and other parts of Breyman's corps, were also of service; but it was not thought adviseable to evacuate the height where Brigadier-general Frazer was posted, otherwise than partially and occasionally.

Major-general Philips, upon first hearing the firing, found his way through a difficult part of the wood to the scene of action, and brought up with him Major Williams and four pieces of artillery, and from that moment I stood indebted to that gallant and judicious second for incessant and most material services; particularly for restoring the action in a point which was critically pressed by a great superiority of fire, and to which

he led up the 20th regiment at the utmost personal hazard.

Major-general Reidesel exerted himself to bring up a part of the left wing, and arrived in time to charge the enemy with regularity and bravery.

Just as the light closed, the enemy gave ground on all sides, and left us compleatly masters of the field of battle, with the loss of about 500 men on their side, and, as supposed, thrice that number wounded.

The darkness preventing a pursuit, the prisoners were few.

The behaviour of the officers and men in general was exemplary. Brigadier-general Frazer took his position in the beginning of the day with great judgment, and sustained the action with constant presence of mind and vigour. Brigadier-general Hamilton was the whole time engaged, and acquitted himself with great honour, activity, and good conduct. The artillery in general was distinguished, and the brigade under Captain  
Fraser,

Jones, who was killed in the action, was conspicuously so.

The army lay upon their arms the night of the 19th, and the next day took a position nearly within cannon shot of the enemy, fortifying their right, and extending their left so as to cover the meadows through which the great river runs, and where the batteaux and hospitals were placed. The 47th regiment, and the regiment of Hesse Hanau, with a corps of Provincials, encamped in the meadows as a further security.

It was soon found that no fruits, honor excepted, were attained by the preceding victory; the enemy working with redoubled ardour to strengthen their left; their right was unattackable already.

On our side it became expedient to erect strong redoubts for the protection of the magazines and hospital, not only against a sudden attack, but also for their security in case of a march to turn the enemy's flank.

21st. A messenger arrived from Sir Harry Clinton, with a letter in cyphers, informing me

me of his intention to attack Fort Montgomery in about ten days from the date of his letter, which was the 10th of September. This was the only messenger of many that I apprehend were dispatched by Sir William Howe and him, that had reached my camp since the beginning of August. He was sent back the same night to inform Sir Harry of my situation, and of the necessity of a diversion to oblige General Gates to detach from his army; and my intention to wait favourable events in that position, if possible, to the 12th of October.

In the course of the two following days, two officers in disguise, and other confidential persons, were dispatched by different routes with verbal messages to the same effect; and I continued fortifying my camp, and watching the enemy, whose numbers increased every day.

3d October. I thought it adviseable to diminish the soldier's ration, in order to lengthen out the provisions, to which measure the army submitted with the utmost cheerfulness. The difficulties of a retreat to Canada were clearly

clearly foreseen, as was the dilemma, should the retreat be effected, of leaving at liberty such an army as General Gates's to act against Sir William Howe.

This consideration operated forcibly to determine me to abide events as long as possible, and I reasoned thus : The expedition I commanded was evidently meant at first to be *hazarded*. Circumstances might require it should be *devoted*; a critical junction of Mr. Gates's force with Mr. Washington might possibly decide the fate of the war; the failure of my junction with Sir Harry Clinton, or the loss of my retreat to Canada, could only be a partial misfortune.

7th. in this situation things continued 'till the 7th, when no intelligence having been received of the expected co-operation, and four or five days for our limited stay in the camp only remained, it was judged advisable to make a movement to the enemy's left, not only to discover whether there was any possible means of forcing a passage should it be necessary to advance, or of dislodging them for the convenience of retreat, but also to co-

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ver a forage of the army, which was in the greatest distress on account of the scarcity.

A detachment of 1500 regular troops, with 2 twelve-pounders, 2 howitzers, and 6 six-pounders, were ordered to move, and was commanded by myself, having with me Major-general Philips, Major-general Reidesel, and Brigadier-general Frazer. The guard of the camp upon the heights was left to Brigadiers-general Hamilton and Speicht; the redoubts and the plain to Brigadier-general Goll; and as the force of the enemy immediately in their front consisted of more than double their numbers, it was not possible to augment the corps that marched beyond the numbers above stated.

I formed the troops within three quarters of a mile of the enemy's left; and Captain Frazer's rangers, with Indians and Provincials, had orders to go by secret paths in the woods, to gain the enemy's rear, and by shewing themselves there to keep them in check.

The further operations intended were prevented by a very sudden and rapid attack of the

the enemy on our left, where the British grenadiers were posted to support the left wing of the line. Major Ackland at the head of them sustained the attack with great resolution; but the enemy's great numbers enabling them in a few minutes to extend the attack along the front of the Germans, which were immediately on the right of the grenadiers, no part of that body could be removed to make a second line to the flank where the stress of the fire lay. The right was at that time unengaged; but it was soon observed that the enemy were marching a large corps round their flank to endeavour cutting off their retreat. The light infantry and part of the 24th regiment, which were at that post, were therefore ordered to form a second line, and to secure the return of the troops into camp.

While this movement was proceeding the enemy pushed a fresh and strong reinforcement to renew the action upon the left, which overpowered by so great a superiority, gave way, and the light infantry and 24th regiment were obliged to make a quick move-

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ment to save that point from being entirely carried, in doing which, Brigadier-general Frazer was mortally wounded.

The danger to which the lines were exposed becoming at this moment of the most serious nature, orders were given to Majors-general Philips and Reidesfel to cover the retreat, while such troops as were most ready for the purpose returned for the defence of them. The troops retreated hard pressed, but in good order. They were obliged to leave 6 pieces of cannon, all the horses having been killed ; and most of the artillery men, who had behaved as usual with the utmost bravery, under the command of Major Williams, being either killed or wounded.

The troops had scarcely entered the camp, when it was stormed with great fury, the enemy rushing to the lines under a severe fire of grape shot and small arms. The post of the light infantry under the command of Lord Belcarres, assisted by some of the line, who threw themselves by order into those entrenchments, was defended with great spirit ; and the enemy, led on by General Arnold,

Arnold, was finally repulsed, and the General wounded; but unhappily the entrenchments of the German reserve, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Breymen, who was killed, were carried, and although ordered to be covered they never were so; and the enemy by that misfortune gained an opening on our right and rear. The night put an end to the action.

Under the disadvantages thus apparent in our situation, the army was ordered to quit the present position during the night, and take post upon the height above the hospital; thus, by an entire change of front, to reduce the enemy to form a new disposition. This movement was effected with great order and without loss, though all the artillery and camp were removed at the same time. The army continued offering battle to the enemy in their new position the whole day of the 8th.

8th. Intelligence was now received that the enemy were marching to turn the right and no means could prevent this measure but retiring to Saratoga. The army

began to move at nine o'clock at night ; Major-general Reidesfel commanding the vanguard, and Major-general Philips the rear.

This retreat, though within musquet shot of the enemy, and encumbered with all the baggage of the army, was made without loss ; but a very heavy rain, and the difficulties of guarding the batteaux which contained all the provisions, occasioned delays which prevented the army reaching Saratoga, till the night of the 9th ; and the artillery could not pass the fords of the Fish-kill till the morning of the 10th.

At our arrival near Saratoga, a corps of the enemy, of between five and six hundred were discovered throwing up intrenchments on the heights, but retired over a ford of the Hudson's River at our approach, and joined a body posted to oppose our passage there.

It was thought proper to send a detachment of artificers, under a strong escort, to repair the bridges and open the road to Fort Edward. The 47th regiment, Capt. Frazer's marksmen, and Mackoy's provincials  
were

were ordered for that service; but the enemy appearing on the heights of Fish-kill in great force, and making a disposition to pass and give us battle, the 47th regiment and Frazer's marksmen were recalled: the provincials left to cover the workmen at the first bridge, ran away upon a very slight attack of a small party of the enemy, and left the artificers to escape as they could, without a possibility of their performing any work.

During these different movements, the batteaux with provisions were frequently fired upon from the opposite side of the river; some of them were lost, and several men were killed and wounded in those which remained.

11th. Attacks upon the batteaux were continued; several were taken and retaken; but their situation being much nearer to the main force of the enemy than to ours, it was found impossible to secure the provisions any otherwise than by landing them and carrying them upon the hill: this was effected under fire, and with great difficulty.

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The possible means of further retreat were now considered in councils of war, composed of the general officers, minutes of which will be transmitted to your Lordship.

The only one that seemed at all practicable was by a night march to gain Fort Edward, with the troops carrying their provisions upon their backs ; the impossibility of repairing bridges, putting a conveyance of artillery and carriages out of the question ; and it was proposed to force the ford at Fort Edward, or the ford above it.

Before this attempt could be made, scouts returned with intelligence that the enemy were intrenched opposite those fords, and possessed a camp in force on the high ground between Fort Edward and Fort George, with cannon ; they had also parties down the whole shore to watch our motions ; and posts so near to us upon our own side of the water as must prevent the army moving a single mile undiscovered.

The bulk of the enemys' army was hourly joined by a new corps of militia and volunteers

teers, and their number together amounted to 16,000 men,

Their position, which extended three parts in four of a circle round us, was from the nature of the ground, inattackable in all parts.

In this situation the army took the best position possible and fortified; waiting 'till the 13th at night in the anxious hope of succours from our friends, or the next desirable expectation, an attack from our enemy.

During this time the men lay continually upon their arms, and were cannonaded in every part; even rifle shot and grape shot came into all parts of the line, though without any considerable effect.

At this period an exact account of the provisions was taken, and the circumstances stated at the opening of this letter became compleat.

The Council of War was extended to all the Field Officers and Captains commanding corps

corps of the army, and the Convention inclosed herewith, ensued; a transaction which I am sure was unavoidable, and which I trust in that situation will be esteemed honourable.

After the execution of the Treaty, General Gates drew together the force that had furrounded my position, and I had the consolation to have as many witnesses as I have men under my command, of its amounting to the numbers mentioned above.

During the events stated above, an attempt was made against Ticonderoga by an army assembled under Major-general Lincoln, who found means to march with a considerable corps from Hubberton undiscovered, while another column of his force passed the mountains between Skenesborough and Lake George; and on the morning of the 18th of September, a sudden and general attack was made upon the Carrying-place at Lake George, Sugar-hill, Ticonderoga, and Mount Independence. The sea-officer commanding the armed sloop stationed to defend the Carrying-place, as also some of the officers commanding at the posts at the Sugar-hill

hill and at the Portage were surprized, and a considerable part of four companies of the 53d regiment were made prisoners; a block-house commanded by Lieutenant Lord of the 53d regiment was the only post on that side that had time to make use of their arms, and they made a brave defence, 'till cannon taken from the surprized vessel was brought against them.

After stating and lamenting so fatal a want of vigilance, I have to inform your Lordship of the satisfactory events which followed.

The enemy having twice summoned Brigadier-general Powell, and received such answers as became a gallant officer entrusted with so important a post; and having tried during the course of four days several attacks, and being repulsed in all, retreated without having done any considerable damage.

Brigadier-general Powell, from whose report to me I extract this relation, gives great commendations to the regiment of Prince Frederick and the other troops stationed

tioned at Mount Independence. The Brigadier also mentions with great applause the behaviour of Captain Taylor of the 21st regiment, who was accidentally there on his road to the army from the hospital, and Lieutenant Beecroft of the 24th regiment, who, with the artificers in arms, defended an important battery.

On the 24th of September the enemy enabled by the capture of the gun boats and bateaux which they had made after the surprize of the sloop to embark upon Lake George, attacked Diamond Island in two divisions.

Captain Aubrey and two companies of the 47th regiment had been posted at that island from the time the army passed the Hudson's River, as a better situation for the security of the stores at the south end of Lake George, than Fort George, which is on the continent, and not tenable against artillery and numbers. The enemy were repulsed by Captain Aubrey with great loss, and pursued by the gun boats under his command to the east shore, where two of their principal vessels were retaken, together with all the cannon; they had just  
time

time to set fire to the other batteaux, and retreated over the mountains.

I beg leave to refer your Lordship for further particulars to my Aid-de-Camp Lord Peterham; and I humbly take occasion to recommend to His Majesty's notice that Nobleman, as one endued with qualities to do important services to his country in every station to which his birth may lead. In this late campaign, in particular, his behaviour has been such as to entitle him to the fullest applause, and I am confident his merit will be thought a sufficient ground for preferment, though deprived of the eclat and sort of claim which generally attends the delivery of fortunate dispatches.

I have only to add, my Lord, a general report of the killed and wounded. I do not give it as correct; the hurry of the time and the separation of the corps, having rendered it impossible to make it so. The British officers have bled profusely and most honourably; all who have fallen were valuable, but the extensive merits which marked the publick and private character of Brigadier-general

ral Frazer will long remain upon the memory of this army, and make his loss a subject of particular regret. Those who remain unwounded have been equally forward; and the General Officers from the mode of fighting, have been more exposed than in other services. Among the rest I have had my escapes. It depends upon the sentence his Majesty shall pass upon my conduct; upon the judgment of my profession, and of the impartial and respectable parts of my country, whether I am to esteem them blessings or misfortunes.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. BURGoyNE.

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